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  1
Harry Kalven and Kenneth Karst in the Supreme Court Review: 
Reflections After Fifty Years 
Mark Tushnet 
 
  Reading the articles by Harry Kalven and Kenneth Karst fifty years after their 
initial publication in the Supreme Court Review is invigorating and dispiriting.
1  
Invigorating, because it reminds a reader in an era of constitutional “theory” how much 
we can learn from incisive doctrinal analyses that worry Supreme Court opinions one 
way and another, trying to figure out what the decisions might mean rather than trying to 
evaluate them by invoking some large interpretive theory or trying to explain them by 
invoking concepts drawn from what we have come to call “other disciplines.”  
Invigorating, too, because the articles show that the questions that scholars today regard 
as deep were already present, though sometimes submerged, in those articles.  But 
dispiriting, because one wonders how much progress we actually have made in 
understanding constitutional law over the past fifty years.  Perhaps we have merely been 
rephrasing in terms we find comforting the questions – and answers – offered by Kalven 
and Karst.
2  And dispiriting, too, because Kalven and Karst write in a style – 
simultaneously detached from and engaged with the Justices – that has been lost to us. 
                                                 
1 Harry Kalven, Jr, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup Ct Rev 1; 
Kenneth I Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup Ct Rev 75. 
2 I should note that I have the recurrent experience of reading older articles – forty or 
more years after publication – and being dismayed to learn that insights that I thought had 
been only recently hard-won were available much earlier.  My dismay passes as I come to Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1738422 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1738422
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  I  Kalven on the Law of Obscenity 
  “The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity” examines in detail several then-
recent Supreme Court decisions.  Time has rendered obsolete most of Kalven’s specific 
arguments, but the way he addressed the decisions remains important.  Perhaps the most 
significant feature of his article is its generosity of spirit.  While criticizing each of them, 
Kalven indicates that every justice made valuable contributions to analyzing the problem 
of regulating obscenity within the Constitution, although no one solved it.  Kalven is 
clearly sympathetic to the outcome reached by Justices Black and Douglas, though he is 
mildly skeptical about their doctrinal absolutism.  He is attracted to Justice Frankfurter’s 
balancing, but he worries that it is too unstructured.  Overall, Kalven presents himself as 
a somewhat detached observer of the Court’s work, yet somehow in dialogue with it.  He 
ends his article with a long paragraph about “the extraordinary difficulty” of the Court’s 
task.
3  The task was difficult because of the “freighted” topic of obscenity, because 
obscenity law raises core issues about freedom of speech, and because “they perform 
                                                                                                                                                 
appreciate that each generation of scholars probably has to discover basic truths for itself.  
The observation usually attributed to Mark Twain comes to mind:  “When I was a boy of 
fourteen, my father was so ignorant I could hardly stand to have the old man around. But 
when I got to be twenty-one, I was astonished at how much the old man had learned in 
seven years.”  I take this to express an important truth about the relation between 
experience and knowledge understood as justified true belief. 
3 Kalven at 45 (cited in note ---). Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1738422
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their roles in an institutional context” of extreme complexity.
4 His final words are, “The 
rest of us are fortunate indeed that our job is so much easier and less responsible.”
5 
 
  A Analyzing the Opinions 
  After a brief discussion of Butler v Michigan,
6 Kalven turned to the opinions in 
Roth v United States and Alberts v California.
7  Roth was a prosecution by the federal 
government for violating a federal statute prohibiting sending obscene publications 
through the mails.  Alberts was a state prosecution for publishing obscene materials. 
Kalven observed that Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court “decisively and 
unequivocally disposed of doubts as to constitutionality, but “by a route which nearly 
bypassed all the perplexities” of the problem.
8  The reason was that Justice Brennan 
treated the question before the Court as whether any regulation of obscenity could pass 
constitutional muster; as we would put it today, the grant of review was limited to a facial 
challenge to obscenity statutes.  Kalven criticized Justice Brennan’s apparent assumption 
that obscenity laws could be unconstitutional only if “under the First Amendment no 
utterances can be prohibited.”
9  In light of United States v Stevens, which appears to have 
held that the categories of “low value” speech are to be determined by a strictly historical 
                                                 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 352 US 380 (1957). 
7 354 US 476 (1957). 
8 Kalven at 8 (cited in note ---). 
9 Id at 9.   4
test without searching for some underlying principle distinguishing low-value from 
higher-value speech,
10 we might say today that Justice Brennan was arguing at least 
implicitly that there was no principled way to distinguish between obscene utterances and 
other “low value” utterances.  Put in those terms, Justice Brennan’s position is more 
defensible than Kalven suggested. 
  Kalven then addressed the two-tier theory directly, which he concluded was an 
approach that “may have unhappy repercussions on the protection of free speech 
generally.”
11  He thought it “difficult to accept as doctrine” even though “it afforded the 
Court a statesmanlike way around a dilemma.”
12  After a long paragraph setting out the 
doctrinal structure of the two-tier theory, Kalven said that the correct question about low-
value speech such as obscenity was, “[W]hat is the social utility of excessively candid 
and explicit discussions of sex?”
13  The next sentence moved to what Kalven clearly 
believed was the heart of the problem, the “mixed utterance,” in which such “excessive” 
                                                 
10 United States v Stevens, 559 US ---, ---, 130 SCt 1577, 1586 (2010) (“Our decisions … 
cannot be taken as establishing a freewheeling authority to declare new categories of 
speech outside the scope of the First Amendment. Maybe there are some categories of 
speech that have been historically unprotected, but have not yet been specifically 
identified or discussed as such in our case law. … We need not foreclose the future 
recognition of such additional categories to reject the Government’s highly manipulable 
balancing test as a means of identifying them.”). 
11 Kalven at 17 (cited in note ---). 
12 Id at 10. 
13 Id at 12.   5
candor is “integral” to some “serious view.”
14  A solution to that problem would lie in the 
definition of obscenity, a definition that Justice Brennan’s formulation of the issue before 
the Court avoided.
15 
  But, Kalven continued, defining obscenity with reference to its worthlessness 
exposed “a difficulty” with traditional defenses of fee speech.
16  Focusing on how speech 
contributes to democratic self-governance does not “help much” in explaining why works 
of imaginative literature and art were covered by the First Amendment:  “The people do 
not need novels or dramas or paintings or poems because they will be called upon to vote.  
Art and belles-lettres do not deal in such ideas….”
17  Conceding the obvious, that the 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 
15 Kalven suggested a definition quite similar to the one on which the Court eventually 
settled before giving up on the definitional task in Miller v California, 413 US 15 (1973):  
“Obscenity must be so defined as to save any serious, complex piece of writing or art.”  
Id at 13.  Given the importance of Kalven’s article, one cannot tell without examining the 
Justices’ papers – which I have not – whether Kalven’s formulation influenced the 
Court’s, whether the Court invented its formulation independently, or whether the 
formulation flowed ineluctably from the Court’s logic so that anyone addressing the 
question of definition would reach the same answer.  Justice Brennan provides the only 
citations in Supreme Court opinions to Kalven’s article, in Ginsberg v United States, 390 
US 629, 637 n 5 (1968), and Paris Adult Theatres I v Slaton, 413 US 49, 97 (1973) 
(Brennan. J, dissenting). 
16 Kalven at 15 (cited in note ---). 
17 Id at 16.   6
Court would place art works under the First Amendment’s coverage,
18 Kalven found “a 
hiatus in our basic free-speech theory.”
19  In my view the gap has not yet been filled and, 
despite Kalven’s prescience, remains largely unnoticed and discussed only rarely.
20 
  Acknowledging that Justice Brennan’s opinion “made several major contributions 
to the law,” Kalven still found the opinion “unsatisfactory” because it endorsed the two-
tier theory and “appeared to find no difficulties” in addressing the problem.
21  He turned 
to the other opinions to show how Justice Brennan’s opinion was “unpersuasive” and to 
illuminate the “full complexity of the issue.”
22  The “difficulties” that Justice Brennan 
“so carefully muted exploded” in Justice Douglas’s dissent, which rejected the two-tier 
theory in favor of “a single unified doctrine of free speech” that rejected judicial attention 
to “the social utility of speech.”
23  Rather, doctrine should permit regulation only if 
“there be evidence of clear danger of action resulting from” any verbal – and, if Kalven 
was right about art, any symbolic – expression.
24 
                                                 
18 Cf Hurley v Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 US 557, 
569 (1995) (describing the “painting of Jackson Pollock [and] the music of Arnold 
Schoenberg” as “unquestionably shielded” by the First Amendment). 
19 Kalven at 16 (cited in note ---). 
20 For a recent treatment, see R George Wright, What Counts as “Speech” in the First 
Place?:  Determining the Scope of the Free Speech Clause, 37 Pepp L Rev 1217 (2010).  
21 Kalven at 17 (cited in note ---). 
22 Ibid. 
23 Id at 18-19. 
24 Id at 19.   7
  Kalven devoted nearly as much space to Justice Harlan’s “complex and 
interesting” opinion as he did to Justice Brennan’s.  He praised Justice Harlan’s 
perception, not inconsistent with anything in Justice Brennan’s opinion, that the question 
of whether a particular item was obscene was a question of constitutional fact, not to be 
conclusively determined by juries or trial judges as fact-finders but subject to 
“independent review” by appellate courts and ultimately the Supreme Court.
25  And, he 
had some striking observations about Justice Harlan’s effort to distinguish between the 
tests to be applied to regulation at the national and state levels.  Going beyond the 
obvious points about federalism, Kalven was struck by the fact that the only free-speech 
cases in which some justices had suggested such a distinction were cases invoking the 
two-tier theory to place some material outside the First Amendment’s coverage:  “Is this 
just a coincidence or is there a relationship?,” he asked.
26  He hinted at an answer, 
mentioning that an unrestrictive rule on the national level would impose a ban on “the 
entire country,” and the local interest in regulation in restriction was stronger (less 
“attenuated,” in Kalven’s words) than the national government’s.
27  Earlier Kalven 
suggested that Justice Brennan’s opinion might be statesmanlike even though doctrinally 
unsatisfactory; the same point is implicit in Kalven’s treatment of Justice Harlan’s 
                                                 
25 Id at 20-21.  Kalven was right, although the experience of giving materials an 
independent review was so distasteful that in the end the Court reformulated the test for 
obscenity in a way that ultimately led to the law’s effective demise.  See text 
accompanying notes --- below. 
26 Id at 23. 
27 Id at 24.   8
opinion, which, though “elegan[t],” was “full of unresolved difficulties,” not unlike 
Justice Brennan’s.
28  In the end, the opinions gave us “more free-speech doctrine than 
can be used sensibly,” an observation bolstered by Justice Harlan’s effort to distinguish 
between the terms used in the federal statute and the state one, which “reveal a capacity 
to find satisfying distinctions that seem too fine for the ordinary mind.”
29 
  Criticizing Justices Brennan and especially Harlan for erecting an unhelpfully 
complex doctrinal structure, Kalven was plainly sympathetic with Justice Douglas’s 
approach, although in a later passage he referred to “doctrinaire liberalism,” which his 
readers would certainly take as a reference to the constitutional jurisprudence of Justices 
Douglas and Black.  Kalven’s sympathy for Justice Douglas’s free-speech absolutism  
suggests a revision in a widespread view about the legal academy and the Court in the 
1950s – that academics derided Justices Black and Douglas for their First Amendment 
absolutism and strongly preferred some form of judicial balancing of competing 
considerations.  Discussing Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in Kingsley Pictures 
Corp v Regents, in which the Court unanimously invalidated New York’s system for 
licensing films, Kalven observed that Frankfurter’s opinion had “familiar echoes of his 
earlier opinions on free speech” in calling for “careful balancing.”
30  Kalven observed, 
“However one may feel about the evils of doctrinaire liberalism against which Mr. Justice 
                                                 
28 Id at 25. 
29 Id at 25, 26. 
30 Id at 31.   9
Frankfurter has so valiantly fought, one cannot, I think, be happy with this opinion.”
31  
The other opinions in the case had “made valid general points” that Frankfurter did not 
deal with:  “In his desire to avoid broad libertarian generalizations, Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter generalized too little.”
32  Here Kalven set out the agenda for at least 
categorical balancing or even absolute (libertarian?) rules, an issue that continues to 
bedevil First Amendment theory as shown by the Stevens decision.
33  In Kalven’s words, 
“The preoccupation with balancing …, although it steers clear of the doctrinaire, comes 
precariously close to the opposite evil of the intuitive, particularized judgment which 
offers no guidance for the future.”
34  This “opened up basic issues transcending the 
problems of obscenity,” the tension between “clear statement[s] of ruling principles” and 
“a particularized balancing that is inevitably personal.”
35 
                                                 
31 Ibid.  See also id at 38 (drawing “the moral” that “there are serious weaknesses in Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter’s favorite doctrine of judicial economy” from his analysis of Justice 
Frankfurter’s criticism of the majority in Smith v California, 361 US 147 (1959), for 
failing to provide adequate guidance to legislative drafters). 
32 Id at 31, 32. 
33 See discussion at note --- above. 
34 Kalven at 32 (cited in note ---). 
35 Id at 34.  Recurring disagreements between Justice Breyer and some of his colleagues 
appear to reproduce the tension Kalven identified, but Justice Breyer’s “balancing” is 
more structured than the one Kalven attributed to Justice Frankfurter.  For additional 
discussion, see text at notes --- below.   10
  Kalven’s attention to “basic issues” recurred in his briefer discussions of the 
Court’s other obscenity cases.  In Smith v California, Justice Frankfurter concurred in the 
result because the trial judge has excluded expert testimony on whether a work’s 
dominant appeal is to “prurient interest measured by prevailing community standards.”
36  
Again “echo[ing]” Justices Douglas and Black, Kalven “suggest[ed] that heavy reliance 
on expert testimony to objectivize the obscenity judgment indicates once again how 
powerful is the argument that that obscenity is a fatally ambiguous concept.”
37  Kalven 
wondered why the jury was not the best measure of community standards; one might add 
that Frankfurter’s endorsement of expert judgment on what might appear to be 
fundamentally normative questions is of a piece with his commitment to the Progressive 
vision of administrative agencies.
38 
  Kalven’s article uses the word “metaphysics” in its title, but he offered no 
extended explanation for that use.
39  My reading of the title makes it compatible with 
                                                 
36 Kalven at 39 (cited in note ---), discussing Smith v California, 361 US 147 (1959). 
37 Ibid. 
38 For a discussion of Frankfurter’s view on administrative agencies and expertise, 
see Mark Tushnet, Administrative Law in the 1930s:  The Supreme Court’s 
Accommodation of Progressive Legal Theory, --- Duke L J (forthcoming 2011). 
39 Indeed, unless I (and the search function in Hein OnLine) missed it, neither the word 
nor any variant occurs in the article’s text or footnotes.  Whether those searches were 
complete is largely irrelevant to my point here, which is that Kalven did not explain his 
use of the term in any detail.  I am reliably informed that the Review’s editor chose the 
title, which probably explains why the article itself does not explain its own title.   11
Kalven’s attitude of detached sympathy.  The problem of obscenity law is metaphysical 
in the serious sense that it raises fundamental questions about what constitutional law is 
and can do.  It is also metaphysical in the somewhat pejorative sense that the Court’s 
discussions are perhaps inevitably detached from the reality with which it and the law of 
obscenity – and, who knows?, perhaps all constitutional law – must deal.
40 
 
  B  Contemporary Problems 
  For all practical purposes the law of obscenity has disappeared from view.  After 
a decade and a half of grappling with the problem, the Court adopted a test for identifying 
obscenity that made “contemporary community standards” determinative.
41  First 
videotapes, then DVDs, and finally the Web made “hard core” obscenity readily 
available.  Community standards changed to the point where prosecutors found it 
essentially pointless to pursue obscenity charges against sexually explicit material 
depicting adults.  The law of obscenity remains one of the better vehicles for explicating 
                                                 
40 The pejorative sense comes through in an extended quotation Kalven offered from a 
brief filed by Thurman Arnold in the Supreme Court, in which Arnold argues, as Kalven 
put it, that “any fool can quickly recognize hard-core pornography, but it is a fatal trap for 
judicial decorum and judicial sanity to attempt thereafter to write an opinion explaining 
why.”  Kalven at 43  (cited in note ---) (quotation from Arnold at 44).  Kalven added a 
note expressing skepticism that it is so easy to identify hard-core pornography:  “One 
suspects that the touchstone is more likely to be the social status of the publisher than the 
content of the item.”  Id at 43 n 129. 
41 Miller v California, 413 US 15 (1973).   12
the two-tier theory of free speech, but even for purely pedagogical purposes the subject 
has become problematic. Aside from the difficulty of discussing obscene material in 
classes where students may be either unfamiliar with the material or familiar with it but 
embarrassed about saying so, the subject has been complicated by efforts to regulate the 
different category of pornography.  Though those efforts appear to have peaked in the 
1990s, they remain interesting conceptually.  They provide a vehicle for exploring the 
possibility of conflicts between constitutional rights or values (free speech and equality) 
and the idea some speech regulations might be defensible as legislative efforts to increase 
the dissemination of speech overall. 
  The “conflict of rights” problem requires us to distinguish between constitutional 
rights and constitutional values; the “maximizing speech” problem requires us to worry 
about the relation between quantity (of speech) and distribution (of speakers).  Kalven’s 
analysis of obscenity law does not help us in thinking about these newer arguments, at 
least directly.  The “rights/values” problem raises questions about the state action 
doctrine and whether we have a constitution of merely negative liberties or one of 
positive rights as well.
42  The “quantity/distribution” problem raises questions about the 
foundations of democracy as a system of government resting on individual autonomy, 
                                                 
42 Legislative regulation of pornography promotes a constitutional value of equality, but 
the source of the inequality lies not in the government decisions that are the focus of a 
state-action oriented account of equality but rather in private decisions.  In a constitution 
of positive rights, the government might be thought to have a duty to address the latter 
source of inequality.  For a discussion, see Frank Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy 
in American Constitutional Argument, 56 Tenn L Rev 291 (1989).   13
more openly addressed in the Supreme Court’s campaign finance decisions.  None of 
those topics appears in Kalven’s article.  But, it is perhaps worth noting that in both areas 
the Court and commentators are often more conclusory than analytical.  Addressing the 
“quantity/distribution” question, for example, the Court curtly observed, “the concept that 
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance 
the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment,”
43 without noting 
that the argument really is that regulation can increase the net amount of speech 
disseminated while incidentally altering its distribution among speakers rather than “in 
order to” alter that distribution.  In thinking about the modern versions of the problems 
Kalven dealt with, we might do well to remember not the specifics of his doctrinal 
analysis but the generous spirit in which he undertook it. 
 
  II Karst on Legislative Facts 
“Legislative Facts in Constitutional Adjudication” took off from the observation 
that many Supreme Court decisions rested on the Justices’ assessment of facts – not 
necessarily the facts of the case at hand, but facts about the way things worked in the 
society at large.  He worried that the Justices’ assessments too often rested on 
assumptions that might not stand up to close examination.  The problem has not 
                                                 
43 Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 48-49 (1976).  The sentiment has been repeated.  See, eg, 
Davis v Federal Election Comm’n, 554 US 724, 753 (2008); Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Comm’n, --- US ---, ---, 130 SCt 876, 904 (2010).   14
disappeared.
44  In the Citizens United decision, the Court had to address the claim that 
independent expenditures by corporations that expressly endorsed or opposed identified 
candidates would lead voters to believe that their votes mattered less than the money 
spent by corporations.  Responding to that claim Justice Kennedy wrote, “The appearance 
of influence or access … will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy.”
45  
This certainly looks like a factual claim.  Justice Kennedy supported it by offering legal 
arguments, the import of which is that it would not be reasonable for people to lose faith 
in democracy in response to such expenditures – perhaps true, but unresponsive to the 
apparent factual claim.
46  Perhaps reflecting an optimism about the role of reason in 
                                                 
44 For a recent overview, see Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism:  Quasi-Neutral 
Principles and Constitutional Truths, 82 N C L Rev 115 (2003). 
45 Citizens United v Federal Elections Comm’n, --- US ---, ---, 130 SCt 876, 910 (2010).  
For another example, see Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 US 1, 3 (2006) (“Voter fraud drives 
honest citizens out of the democratic process and breeds distrust of our government. 
Voters who fear their legitimate votes will be outweighed by fraudulent ones will feel 
disenfranchised.”), discussed in Richard L Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v Gore, 
60 Stan L Rev 1, 35 (2007).  (The examples should not be taken to suggest that I believe 
that election law cases distinctively produce unsupported reliance on empirical claims.) 
46 The remainder of the Citizens United paragraph reads, “By definition, an independent 
expenditure is political speech presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a 
candidate. The fact that a corporation, or any other speaker, is willing to spend money to 
try to persuade voters presupposes that the people have the ultimate influence over 
elected officials. This is inconsistent with any suggestion that the electorate will refuse   15
adjudication, Karst offered a series of sensible suggestions for making the Court more 
familiar with the social facts on which informed constitutional adjudication should rest.  
Before he did so, though, he developed a description of an adjudicatory approach that 
retains vitality. 
 
  A Analyzing the Opinions 
  Karst began by describing the once-famous “mud flaps” case, where the Court 
invalidated a state law requiring the use of curved mud flaps on trucks passing through 
the state.
47  As Karst put it, “everyone connected with the case” understood that the 
“ultimate question” was, “How much more effective must the new guard be to justify a 
cost of $30 per truck … in light of the fact that other states permit the use of the old-style 
guards?”
48  Justice Douglas’s opinion for the Court characterized the problem as 
involving “questions of degree,”
49 which led Karst to reflect on the “dispute between the 
so-called balancers and absolutists.”
50  For Karst, denying that balancing was inevitable 
was “to strike at the heart of the rule of law.”
51 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘“to take part in democratic governance”’ because of additional political speech made by 
a corporation or any other speaker.”  --- US at ---, 130 SCt at 910. 
47 Bibb v Navajo Freight Lines, 359 US 520 (1959). 
48 Karst at 78 (cited in note ---). 
49 359 US at 530. 
50 Karst at 78 (cited in note ---). 
51 Id at 80.   16
  Responding to the argument that balancing was impossible because the values at 
stake were incommensurable,
52 Karst launched into his first major analytic effort, aimed 
at providing a structure for conducting the balancing.  He used Breithaupt v Abram to 
focus his discussion.
53  There the Court upheld a conviction based on the administration 
of a blood alcohol test to a driver rendered unconscious in an automobile collision.  Karst 
asked what the questions of legislative fact were in that case.  “First of all, how serious is 
the invasion of the accused’s person?”
54  We might note immediately that characterizing 
“seriousness of invasion of person” as a question of fact at all is not the obviously correct 
course.  Karst’s meaning is clear, though:  We can array intrusions on the person along a 
single dimension, with something like taking fingerprints near one end and performing a 
risky and non-lifesaving operation to remove a bullet near the other.
55  In performing the 
required balancing, we will initially ask where on this continuum the intrusion is. 
                                                 
52 Cf Bendix Autolite Corp v Midwesco Enterprises, Inc, 486 US 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, 
J, concurring in the judgment) (“This process is ordinarily called ‘balancing,’ but the 
scale analogy is not really appropriate, since the interests on both sides are 
incommensurate. It is more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a 
particular rock is heavy.”).  (Eccles 1:9:  “What has been will be again, what has been 
done will be done again; there is nothing new under the sun.”). 
53 352 US 432 (1957). 
54 Karst at 82 (cited in note ---). 
55 For the bullet-extraction example, see Winston v Lee, 470 US 753 (1985).   17
  Next, “What is the purpose of this invasion of the body?”
56  This looks like an 
ordinary adjudicative fact:  Did the police take the blood sample because they were 
investigating a crime or because one of them had a perverted interest in acquiring blood 
for his collection?
57  Karst, though, saw a question of legislative fact lurking:  Assuming 
that the police are engaged in an investigation, “how effectively will the blood test fulfill” 
the investigative purpose?”
58  Perhaps the tests for determining blood-alcohol levels are 
quite bad, or though good in principle are routinely done quite badly by the laboratories 
the police use.  But, Karst observed, the tests were “almost universally well-regarded for 
their reliability,” and “there is widespread scientific agreement” that people with high 
blood-alcohol levels are physically impaired.
59 
  That is not the end of the inquiry, though.  Perhaps there is “some alternative way 
of achieving those same good purposes without causing the same impact on the 
individual’s liberty.”
60  Karst catalogued some possibilities – getting evidence about how 
much liquor the driver had consumed, testimony about smelling liquor on the driver’s 
breath – but observed that they might not be as effective in proving high blood-alcohol 
                                                 
56 Karst at 82 (cited in note ---). 
57 The allusion here is to the television series “Dexter” (Showtime, since 2006), based on 
the novel, Jeff Lindsay, I'm attaching some information for authors of the Routledge 
Handbook on Constitutional Law.  Please let me know if you hDarkly Creaming Dexter 
(Doubleday, 2004). 
58 Karst at 82 (cited in note ---). 
59 Ibid. 
60 Id at 83.   18
levels as the blood test was.  Suppose, though, that the police had available a less 
intrusive technology, perhaps one that could determine blood-alcohol levels from beads 
of sweat (or could be induced to encourage the development of such a technology were 
they barred from taking the driver’s blood)?
61 
  Karst then generalized.  The question for balancers will take a common form.  
“How much will this regulation advance the chosen governmental objective?,” taking 
into account the possibility of “partial success,” and “How much more will this regulation 
advance the objective than some other regulation which might interfere less with 
constitutionally protected interests?”  In addition, “How much will freedom … be 
restricted by this regulation,” again considering the probabilities of complete and only 
partial effectiveness, and “How much more restrictive is this regulation than some other 
regulation which might achieve the same objective?”
62  Again Karst characterized all 
these as “questions of fact.”
63 
                                                 
61 Karst used the example of a “‘drunkometer’ balloon.”  Ibid.  Karst repeated this type of 
analysis in his discussion of Talley v California, 362 US 60 (1960), where the Court 
invalidated a city ordinance prohibiting the distribution of handbills that lacked the names 
and addresses of the authors.  Karst at 92-93 (cited in note ---) (asking, inter alia, how 
often have anonymous handbills be used in frauds, how many complaints had there been 
to the Better Business Bureau, and were there reasons for handbill distributors to be 
concerned for their safety were their names to appear on the handbills).  To the same 
effect, see his discussion of Huron Portland Cement Co v Detroit, 362 US 440 (1960), at 
96 (providing a similar list of questions). 
62 Id at 84.   19
Today this is almost instantly recognizable as the kind of structured 
proportionality inquiry used by constitutional courts around the world.
64  If structure is 
all one is seeking, Karst’s or some similar formulation might be entirely adequate.  But, 
we have learned that describing the problem as one involving the assessment of facts, 
even legislative facts, will not in the end solve the incommensurability problem.  The 
reason is easiest to see in the stage known elsewhere as the application of the test of 
“proportionality as such” and in Karst’s formulation as the determination of the 
governmental objective.  Karst’s analysis of Breithaupt helps identify the difficulty.  The 
government’s primary objective is determining accurately the degree of the driver’s 
impairment, and there may be other less intrusive technologies that do as good a job as 
the blood test in measuring that.  The government has other objectives, though, including 
a budget constraint:  It wants to determine impairment as accurately as it can within some 
budget for doing so.  And, again generalizing, it will almost always be the case that there 
                                                                                                                                                 
63 Ibid. 
64 For one widely followed formulation, see R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103 (Sup Ct 
Canada), ¶ 70: “First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the 
objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational 
considerations. In short, they must be rationally connected to the objective. Second, the 
means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this first sense, should impair ‘as 
little as possible’ the right or freedom in question. Third, there must be a proportionality 
between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or 
freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of ‘sufficient importance.’”   20
is a tradeoff between the primary objective and other objectives when considering 
alternative means, one more intrusive than the other.
65 
A section explaining that judicial attention to legislative facts would not be 
inconsistent with a presumption of constitutionality alluded to differences in the trial 
records in two First Amendment cases, observing that in one “the Court … was faced 
with a record almost devoid of consideration of the legislative facts, and with briefs of 
counsel which only partly filled the void.”
66  Karst used those differences to introduce a 
discussion of what could be done to improve the Supreme Court’s ability to determine 
legislative facts. 
Legislative facts, according to Karst, involved “prediction and probability,” 
complex matters for which judges “need[] expert help.”
67  Brandeis briefs could do 
something, but trials at which issues of legislative fact were explored were better because 
trial judges could sort out and evaluate the complexities.  Karst devoted several pages to 
exploring the conditions under which expert testimony and cross-examination were likely 
to be better than expert memoranda (and counter-memoranda) in putting the trial judge in 
a position to determine the legislative facts.  Then Karst turned to the ability of judges to 
                                                 
65 The point is well-known in the literature on proportionality and of course in parallel 
contexts such as purposive statutory interpretation.  For one particularly clear exposition, 
see Mark Elliott, “Proportionality and Deference:  The Importance of a Structured 
Approach,” in Effective Judicial Review:  A Cornerstone of Good Governance 264, 277-
80 (Christopher Forsyth et al, eds 2010). 
66 Karst at 91 (cited in note ---). 
67 Id at 99-100.   21
evaluate the enhanced records they would have before them.  He urged conscientious 
efforts, but could offer little beyond that other than a reiteration of the “traditional 
American faith in the value of education.”
68  His approach, he wrote, “envisages judges 
who take a more aggressive role than that which is customary, judges who do not leave to 
the parties the determination of the issues to be litigated but who actively promote the 
exploration of issues which the parties might be content to leave untouched.”
69  Again, 
Karst did not explore whether judges in the real world could do that to some reasonably 
acceptable level of quality.  He did observe that because “the presumption of 
constitutionality is weakest … [where] there is the least difference between the 
competence of lay judgment and that expert judgment,” the presumption could do some 
work – although precisely because experts and judges could draw on the same general 
information where the presumption of constitutionality was weak, we can wonder 
whether enhancing the records makes much difference in this category of cases. 
 
  B  Contemporary Problems 
  Some of Karst’s proposals for reform are the product of the times.  He was 
committed to the Progressive vision of government and its problems, opening his article 
with a reference to “the rapidity of contemporary social, technological, political, and 
economic changes,” and in his proposals for reform expressing a confidence in the ability 
of experts to provide the information needed for courts to address the problems posed by 
                                                 
68 Id at 112. 
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those changes.
70  Some of the proposals seem in retrospect a bit naïve.  In part the 
difficulty is that Karst may have identified primarily failures of advocacy, cases in which 
lawyers failed to use techniques that were available to them.  If such failures are a 
problem, one would think that reforms lie in the direction of improving attorney quality 
rather than in providing lawyers unable effectively to use the tools at hand with an 
additional set of tools, unless there is some reason to think that the new tools are easier 
for lawyers of unchanged quality to use.
71 
Consider the idea of building better trial records on factual matters.  Powell v 
Texas involved a constitutional challenge to then-widespread policies of charging 
homeless alcoholics with public drunkenness.
72  At trial in a Texas municipal court 
Powell’s lawyer argued that the charge was a status offense imposing liability on those 
who because of their medical condition could not control their appearance in public.  He 
supported the argument with testimony from a medical doctor to the effect that 
alcoholism was a disease.  The trial judge made “findings of fact” about alcoholism, 
including that chronic alcoholics do “not appear in public by [their] own volition.”
73  The 
Supreme Court rejected Powell’s claim, with Justice Marshall observing that “the record 
in this case is utterly inadequate to permit the sort of informed and responsible 
adjudication which alone can support the announcement of an important and wide-
                                                 
70 Id at 76. 
71 Karst referred to “failure[s]” by members of the bar, partly attributable to “judges who 
do not demand that counsel fulfill their responsibilities.”  Id at 99. 
72 392 US 514 (1968). 
73 Quoted in id at 521.   23
ranging new constitutional principle,” and that “[t]he trial hardly reflects the sharp legal 
and evidentiary clash between fully prepared adversary litigants which is traditionally 
expected in major constitutional cases.”
74 
  Perhaps Powell’s lawyer did not go far enough in the direction Karst urged.  Yet, 
we can wonder about the effectiveness of trials as venues for exploring the legislative 
facts on which Karst focused.  More extensive trials, of course, but also at much greater 
expense, with costs borne at least initially by lawyers with other cases to handle.
75  From 
that perspective, we might be impressed with how much an ordinary lawyer in a Texas 
municipal court did to build a record on the nature and effects of alcoholism, and take 
that to indicate some deeper flaw in Karst’s effort to improve the Court’s ability to assess 
legislative facts by developing better records at trial.  Supplementing trials with amicus 
briefs and the like generates information provided by competing – and hired – experts, 
                                                 
74 Id at 521-22. 
75 Karst alluded to the problem in commenting that it might not be “worth the very 
considerable extra expense and delay” occasioned by remanding a criminal case for 
further factual development, but he suggested even so that it “may be appropriate” to “put 
[a criminal defendant] through the wringer a second time … when large interests are 
represented as parties or sponsors of the litigation,” for example, the context suggests, 
when the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People or the American 
Civil Liberties Union was involved.  Karst at 95-96 (cited in note ---).  See also id at 101 
(noting that “testimony tends to be more costly to the parties”).   24
with “axes to grind,” as Karst put it,
76 probably leaving the justices no better informed 
about the facts than they would have been without the additional information.
77 
  Justice Marshall’s observation in Powell that “there is no agreement among 
members of the medical profession about what it means to say that ‘alcoholism’ is a 
‘disease’”
78 suggests another, probably larger difficulty.  Often legislative facts will be 
open to reasonable contestation.
79  One expert will say that tires will explode under 
normal operating conditions at a rate of X blow-outs per mile if they are inflated to Y 
pounds per square inch, another will say that at Y pounds the blow-out rate will be Z.  
Surveys will have to be interpreted, and experts will raise reasonable questions about the 
effects of the questions’ precise phrasing on reported outcomes.  Statisticians will 
question the model specification used to produce epidemiological estimates about some 
phenomenon important to the factual basis for legislation.
80  We can get reasonably 
                                                 
76 Id at 105. 
77 Cf id at 96 (referring to “doubts about the ability of experts to improve on the justices’ 
own efforts”). 
78 Id at 522. 
79 For examples from Supreme Court decisions, see San Antonio Ind Sch Dist v 
Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 26-27 (1973) (raising questions about what the statistical material 
submitted in the lower courts showed about relevant constitutional questions); 
McCleskey v Kemp, 481 US 279, 312 (1987) (“At most, the Baldus study indicates a 
discrepancy that appear to correlate with race”) (emphasis added).   
80 For an amusing list of all-purpose objections to empirical studies, see George Stigler, 
The Conference Handbook, 85 J Pol Econ 441 (1977).    25
precise estimates of such facts as the rate at which the moon orbits the earth – certainly 
good enough to support legislation.  But, of course, facts of that sort are almost never 
legislative facts in Karst’s sense.  Where more contestable facts are involved, which is to 
say with respect to almost every statute, an approach to constitutional adjudication that 
makes choices among such facts important seems misguided. 
  A more general way of putting this is that legislative “facts” might not really be 
facts of the sort scientists discover and epistemologists describe.  Here the recent trial in 
California’s federal gay-marriage case may be exemplary.  The district judge heard 
extensive testimony and made extensive findings of fact about whether individuals 
choose their sexual orientation, about whether the availability of same-sex marriage will 
affect the stability of opposite-sex marriage, and more.
81  There is nothing wrong with 
calling these facts, but one need not be a post-modernist skeptic to think that they are 
qualitatively different from facts like the rate at which the moon orbits the earth. 
There is, I suggest, a better way of thinking about the legislative facts on which 
Karst focused.  Some of those facts are like the ones physical scientists report, but others 
are not.  They are ways in which people in a scientifically oriented society articulate their 
competing visions of how a good (or decent, or well-ordered) society operates.  Justice 
Kennedy’s seemingly factual assertions about the relation between campaign finance and 
the American people’s confidence in our political system fit this description. I believe – 
not claims about the way the world is though stated in those terms, but claims about the 
                                                 
81 Perry v Schwarzenegger, 704 FSupp 2d 921 (ND Cal 2010).   26
way the world ought to be.
82  And, Karst’s proposed reforms would not provide the 
justices much help in figuring out the constitutional questions they face by providing 
them with the “facts” on which their judgments should rest. 
The second theme in Karst’s article was structured balancing, a topic that Justice 
Breyer has addressed recently.  In District of Columbia v Heller Justice Breyer 
supplemented Justice Stevens’s account of the original meaning of the Second 
Amendment with a detailed examination of whether the challenged restriction on 
handgun possession in the home was proportional to the problems the District was 
attempting to address.
83  As noted above, courts around the world have used doctrines of 
proportionality as well.  Scholars have begun to explore whether “it” is a unitary doctrine, 
                                                 
82 Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special 
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Md L Rev 563, 603 
(1982) (“the move to efficiency transposes a conflict between groups in civil society from 
the level of a dispute about justice and truth to a dispute about facts – about probably 
unknowable social science data that no one will ever actually try to collect but which 
provides ample room for fanciful hypotheses.”), offers a more tempered version of this 
suggestion.  Kennedy suggests that the inevitable ambiguities in the facts conceded to be 
relevant leave space for a judge acting in good faith to see as “established” those facts 
that are compatible with his or her vision of the world, which Kennedy calls “ideology.” 
83 554 US 570, ---, 128 SCt 2783, 2852 (2008) (Breyer, J, dissenting) (enumerating cases 
in which the Court has “applied” proportionality analysis).  Justice Breyer elaborated on 
his approach in Stephen Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work:  A Judge’s View (2010).   27
a “universal rule of law,” as one Canadian scholar puts it,
84 or whether a common 
language of proportionality and even a seemingly common analytic structure conceal the 
kinds of variations in legal culture that occur in nearly every comparative study. 
Taking Justice Breyer’s opinion in Heller as their starting point, Moshe Cohen-
Eliya and Iddo Porat distinguish between what they call “intrinsic” and “bounded” 
balancing.
85  The former, characteristic of German constitutional law, “expresses values 
of compromise, mediation, and pluralism,” and “is tied to an organic conception of the 
state, under which all organs trust one another and cooperate to realize common values 
that express the spirit of the nation.”
86  It is not “a pragmatic enterprise involving some 
sort of cost-benefit analysis,” but rather attempts to “optimize[] the constitutional value 
order.”
87  In contrast, Cohen-Eliya and Porat argue, balancing in US constitutional law 
                                                 
84 David M. Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (2004). 
85 Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, The Hidden Foreign Law Debate in Heller:  The 
Proportionality Approach in American Constitutional Law, 46 San Diego L Rev 367 
(2009).  For a more general treatment of proportionality analysis in a problem of 
comparative methodology, see Jacco Bomhoff, Balancing, the Global and the Local:  
Judicial Balancing as a Problematic Topic in Comparative (Constitutional) Law, 31 
Hastings Int’l & Comp L Rev 555 (2008). 
86 Cohen-Eliya & Porat at 388 (cited in note ---). 
87 Id at 393, 394.  The reference to the “constitutional value order” is to the decision of 
the German constitutional court in the Lüth case, 7 BVerfGe 198 (1958), partially 
translated in Donald Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic 
of Germany 361 (2d ed 1997), whose holding that the German Basic Law enacts an   28
accommodates “the suspicion-based American approach to the state,” with a “residual 
and instrumental role” within bounds set by the dominant theory of rights as trumps.
88  It 
is instrumental and pragmatic rather than “idealistic and formalistic.”
89  Certainly Justice 
Breyer thinks of himself as a pragmatist, as Cohen-Eliya and Porat would expect. 
  The use of non-US materials in US constitutional interpretation has of course 
been quite controversial, but comparisons can be illuminating even if – or perhaps 
because – they are not used as the basis for interpreting the Constitution.  The 
reappearance of discussions of balancing, now labeled proportionality, provides scholars 
with opportunities to explore again the territory Karst went over, and in particular to 
examine how there might be a distinctively American form of structured balancing. 
 
 III  Conclusion 
None of what I have said so far means that the articles are without flaws that later 
scholarship helps identify.  Central to Kalven’s article, for example, is the observation 
that “the evil of arousing revulsion in adults … is simply too trivial a predicate for 
constitutional regulation.”
90  Earlier, discussing Justice Harlan’s approach to the problem 
                                                                                                                                                 
“objective order of values” has become the foundation of the German constitutional law 
of individual rights.  The decision  
88 Cohen-Eliya & Porat at 396, 399. 
89 Id at 399. 
90 Kalven at 42 (cited in note ---).  Although the words are ambiguous, I take 
“constitutional regulation” to mean, not “regulation by the Constitution,” but “statutory 
regulation that survives constitutional challenge.”  For confirmation of that interpretation,   29
of regulation of obscenity, Kalven quoted Harlan’s use of “the familiar” standard, that a 
legislature’s judgment “not be ‘irrational,’” in connection with Harlan’s treatment of the 
claim that consumption of obscenity might induce “obnoxious” sexual conduct.
91  Today 
we would properly not accept the judgment of even as sensible a person as Kalven that a 
specified “evil” was “too trivial.”  We would ask whether the legislature’s judgment that 
the evil was worth public regulation was reasonable.  And, we would worry about the 
status of the claim that we can assess a judgment about moral evil – “arousing revulsion” 
– with criteria of rationality.  We might ask whether it is enough that there be a 
reasonable basis for thinking that moral evils can be determined through rational analysis 
and then that there be a reasonable basis, from within that way of thinking, for 
concluding that “arousing revulsion” is a moral evil.  Kalven’s assessment that the evil 
was “too trivial” might reflect his judgment that, from some unspecified perspective, the 
legislative judgment is unreasonable or irrational, but he was so sensible that he did not 
see that there might be other perspectives that legislatures were entitled to take. 
  Similarly, Kalven used a familiar trope of raising questions left unresolved by the 
decisions they analyze.  For example, Justice Frankfurter was “silent” about “valid 
general points” made by his colleagues:  “Is thematic obscenity constitutionally subject to 
state control? … Is the … statute too vague?”
92  We know that this sort of “twenty 
                                                                                                                                                 
see id at 4 (“Arousing disgust and revulsion in a voluntary audience seems an impossibly 
trivial base for making speech a crime.”) 
91 Id at 24 (quoting Roth v United States, 354 US 476, 501-02 (1957) (Harlan, J, 
concurring)). 
92 Id at 31.   30
questions” criticism is close to vacuous because it is always available and never really 
cogent.
93  It is always available because no decision can foreclose litigation exploring the 
contours of the doctrine it articulates, if only because attempts to do so can always be 
dismissed as dicta unnecessary for the disposition of the case before the Court.  And, it is 
never really cogent because a decision takes on meaning only as later courts use it.
94 
  “Well, nobody’s perfect,”
95 but Kalven and Karst come close.  Their articles stand 
up extraordinarily well after fifty years.  Absolutism versus categorical balancing versus 
ad hoc balancing:  We still worry about these, now calling them rules and standards or 
proportionality and unguided discretion, and it unclear that we know much more about 
                                                 
93 For the best recent example of the “twenty questions” approach, see Caperton v AT 
Massey Coal Co, --- US ---, ---, 129 SCt 2252, 2269-72 (2009) (Roberts CJ, dissenting) 
(listing forty questions unresolved by the majority’s holding). 
94 For the most sophisticated exposition of this proposition of which I am aware, see 
Deutsch, Precedent and Adjudication, 83 Yale L J 1553 (1974).  As I understand it, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s approach to writing decisions rested on a similar view.  His opinions 
were spare in the extreme, describing the case facts, listing the precedents thought 
relevant, and stating that the precedents supported the conclusion announced.  Rehnquist 
eschewed extended analysis of how one got from the precedents to the result because, I 
believe, he understood that no matter what he said, later courts would pour content into 
the result without regard to the proferred reasoning. 
95 Quotation from “Some Like It Hot” (United Artists, 1959), final line.   31
the problems than when Kalven and Karst illuminated them.
96  Kalven’s article ended 
with a footnote offering “an inventory” of four judicial roles in obscenity cases:  “urbane 
resignation” exemplified by Learned Hand, “irreverent amusement” exemplified by 
Jerome Frank, “uncompromising concern with free speech,” as with Justices Black and 
Douglas, and the role taken by “the responsible man of affairs who feels that there are 
limits to what the public will tolerate a court’s saying … exemplified by most members 
of the Court.”
97  Kalven was too good a writer to say so, but this inventory covers a great 
deal, perhaps all, of constitutional law, and scholars as well as judges.  In his article 
Kalven took the first role, of urbane detachment, with a hint of the second.  Yet, I think it 
reasonably clear that he thought the fourth, that of the “responsible man of affairs,” was 
the one our judges should take.  As the final line of his article showed, he believed that 
the judges’ job is different from that of the scholar, who has the freedom to be 
irresponsible.  And, if scholarship has its virtues, so does responsibility.  We should 
admire, Kalven suggested, those who take on important public responsibilities, and not be 
too harsh in evaluating their work with urbane detachment and irreverent amusement.  
Even Kalven’s critical comments are generally offered in subdued tones:  An argument 
                                                 
96 We talk about the problems in different terms because of the rise of “constitutional 
theory,” but whether the terminology (for example, of decision costs and error costs in 
connection with the rules/standards or absolutism/balancing discussions) has added 
anything significant to our knowledge seems to me an open question. 
97 Kalven at 45 n 132 (cited in note ---).   32
“is curious,” it “is unfortunate that the collision of complex analyses … could not have 
been carried to more explicit resolution.”
98 
  A few years later Kalven’s law school colleague and the founding editor of the 
Supreme Court Review Philip Kurland made what might have seemed the same point 
about the burdens of public responsibility in the concluding paragraph of his Foreword to 
the Harvard Law Review’s annual issue on the Supreme Court:  “It behooves any critic of 
the Court’s performance to close on a note reminiscent of the wall plaque of frontier 
times:  ‘Don’t shoot the piano player.  He’s doing his best.’”
99  The tone, though, was 
different and much sharper, hardly sympathetic to the constraints the “responsible man of 
affairs” necessarily finds himself under and properly accommodates.  For, Kurland’s final 
sentences were, “It is still possible … to wish that he would stick to the piano and not try 
to be a one-man band.  It is too much to ask that he take piano lessons.”
100 
  Kurland’s tone foreshadowed a change in the rhetoric in which academic 
discourse about the Supreme Court was conducted that, I suggest, came about because of 
the rise of “constitutional theory,” understood as the enterprise of identifying the single 
best method of constitutional interpretation that simultaneously licensed judges to find 
some statutes unconstitutional and constrained them from doing so to advance their mere 
“policy” preferences.  Perhaps it was not inevitable, but the rise of constitutional theory 
conduced to characterization of those who disagreed with the writer’s preferred 
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Executive Branches of the Government, 78 Harv L Rev 143, 196 (1964). 
100 Ibid.   33
constitutional theory as either fools or knaves:  fools, because they lacked the intellectual 
capacity to understand the compelling logic of the arguments supporting the theory, or 
knaves, because, knowing that the theory was the best one available, they willfully 
disregarded it in the service of their personal projects.
101  The ideas that the constitutional 
questions the Supreme Court deals with are genuinely difficult and that the Justices, 
people of varying intellectual ability, can reasonably disagree over, for example, the 
strength of the originalist evidence for and against the positions taken by the majority and 
dissent in District of Columbia v Heller are almost completely absent from today’s 
constitutional discourse – and those who try to advance those ideas are dismissed as naïve 
(fools) or as pursuing a concealed political agenda (knaves). 
  The issues Kalven and Karst discussed remain with us, but their sensibility has 
been lost. It would, I think, be good to retrieve it, but I wonder whether that is possible. 
An intellectually ambitious scholar today who is the same age as Kalven and Karst were 
when they wrote their articles would be well-advised – and I am sure is advised – to 
avoid doing “mere doctrinal work.”
102  Kalven and Karst were engaged with doctrine far 
                                                 
101 I do not exempt myself from participation in the discourse of foolishness and knavery.  
For the most notorious example, see Mark Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 Mich L Rev 694 
(1980).  I am older and, I hope, wiser now.  (For that reason, I refrain from providing 
examples of the discourse of foolishness and knavery, but I do note that it is not confined 
to the academy but infects the Supreme Court itself.) 
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more deeply than today’s scholars are.
103  For obvious structural reasons those with dual 
degrees in law and some other discipline are unlikely to, and in my experience do not, 
achieve the heights that Kalven and Karst reached.
104  But, only by reaching those 
heights can one truly appreciate the difficulties faced by “responsible men of affairs,” and 
                                                 
103 An example is found in the care Kalven took to distinguish between direct regulation 
of obscenity – penalties imposed on its dissemination – and indirect regulation through 
rules that induce self-interested actors to “steer wide[] of the forbidden zone,” as Justice 
Brennan put it in a related context.  Speiser v Randall, 357 US 513, 526 (1958).  Drawing 
on his wide knowledge in the field, Kalven pointed out that lower courts, with seeming 
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regulations.  Kalven at 36-37 (cited in note ---). 
104 Briefly:  Although reasonably smart, well-trained lawyers can do doctrinal analysis to 
a decent level of sophistication, doing doctrinal analysis at the highest level is difficult 
indeed, requiring a fair amount of intellectual facility and a wide grasp of doctrine from 
many fields.  Dividing one’s intellectual effort between acquiring facility in doctrinal 
analysis and achieving distinction in another discipline means that one will be unable to 
reach the heights of doctrinal analysis.  And, on the other side, in every “other” discipline 
of which I am aware, the field “other discipline of law” (legal history, sociology of law, 
economics of law, and the like) is marginal to the discipline as a whole, which means that 
the most able graduate students will be drawn to the fields at the discipline’s core, leaving 
the subfield dealing with law populated by perfectly able but not truly exceptional 
students.  (There are of course exceptions, quite rare in my experience.)   35
thereby achieve the detached sympathy that Kalven and Karst had for the Supreme Court 
and its work.  That few scholars today have the capacity to do so is unfortunate. 